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ABSTRACT 
Strategic Information Revelation and Revenue Sharing in an R&D Race 
by Jos Jansen 
Firms learn imperfectly about their cost of investment. We study how this information 
affects firms' incentives to invest in  R&D by comparing investments and profits under 
public and private information. Revenue sharing between the winner and loser of the 
race, e.g. through licensing contracts, weakens the appropriability of the innovation's 
revenues, and creates free- rider effects. These free-rider effects not only soften R&D 
competition, but also affect the firms' incentives to acquire and reveal information. How 
much information firms eventually reveal, and consequently the information acquisition 
and innovation incentives, also depends on the verifiability of  information.  
 
Keywords: R&D, Competition, Revelation, Information Acquisition, Revenue Sharing 
JEL Classification: D82, D83, L23, O31, O32 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die strategische Preisgabe von Informationen und Einnahmeaufteilungen in  
einem F&E- Wettrennen 
Unternehmen können ihre F&E-Investitionskosten nicht perfekt beobachten. Wir 
untersuchen, wie Informationen über diese Kosten die Investitionsanreize von 
Unternehmen beeinflusst. Zu diesem Zweck vergleichen wir das  Investitionsniveau und 
die Gewinne bei öffentlich verfügbaren Informationen mit den entsprechenden Werten 
bei privaten Informationen. Eine Aufteilung der Einnahmen zwischen dem Gewinner 
und dem Verlierer des Rennens, beispielsweise durch Lizenzverträge, schwächt die 
Möglichkeiten, sich die Einnahmen aus der Innovation anzueignen und schafft 
Trittbrettfahrereffekte.  Die Trittbrettfahrereffekte mildern nicht nur den F&E- 
Wettbewerb sondern beeinflussen auch die Anreize des Unternehmens, Informationen 
zu beschaffen  und offenzulegen.  Die Menge der Informationen die sich die 
Unternehmen beschaffen, die letztendlich von den Unternehmen preisgeben werden und  
die Innovationsanreize hängen darüber hinaus von der Überprüfbarkeit der 
Informationen ab. 
 
1 Introduction
Innovative Þrms that invest in research and development (R&D) create new
information in an industry. Firms in an R&D race actively manage this
information. It is well-known that Þrms are only willing to reveal the contents
of their innovation if this innovation is suﬃciently protected.1 Firms do not
only manage information about the contents of their innovation, but also
strategically reveal and conceal information about their relative eﬃciency to
aﬀect competition in R&D. For example announcements by Þrms in high-tech
industries, such as the biotech and the software industry, about intermediate
successes are common in practice. While most literature on R&D competition
focuses on incentives for revelation of the innovations contents, this paper
analyzes incentives for the acquisition and revelation of the innovators costs
of investment.
The incentives to reveal intermediate information are determined by the
eﬀect of this information on the Þrms incentives to invest in R&D. We study
these incentive eﬀects by comparing investments and proÞts under public and
private information.
We distinguish two conßicting eﬀects of information about a Þrms R&D
eﬃciency on competition by the Þrms rivals. First there is a strategic ef-
fect. A Þrm that has a leading position in an R&D race obtains a strategic
advantage, which weakens its rivals incentive to invest in obtaining the in-
novation. Therefore good news about one Þrms relative expected cost of
investment reveals that the Þrm will be an aggressive R&D investor, which
discourages its rivals. This eﬀect is analyzed extensively in the literature
on dynamic R&D competition, see e.g. Grossman and Shapiro (1987), and
Harris and Vickers (1987).
The second eﬀect, which conßicts with the strategic eﬀect, is the infor-
mational eﬀect. Good news about one Þrms eﬃciency does not only reveal
information about the relative eﬃciency of the Þrm, but can also reveal in-
formation about the absolute cost of investment. When Þrms apply similar
R&D technologies to make their innovation, their costs of investments are
correlated. In that case, good intermediate news for one Þrm makes its rivals
1For overviews of the basic issues, see e.g. Scotchmer (1991), and Ordover (1991).
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more optimistic about their opportunities in the R&D race, which intensi-
Þes competition.2 Choi (1991) and Malueg and Tsutsui (1996) analyze the
R&D investments that result from the trade-oﬀ between the strategic and
informational eﬀects. We focus in this paper on the informational eﬀect of
intermediate information, by assuming perfect positive correlation between
the Þrms costs of investment. This enables us to ignore the incentive eﬀects
of revealing the contents of the Þrms innovation, since this information is
the same for the Þrms in the race.
Besides the incentive eﬀects of intermediate information, we study the
eﬀects of changes in the appropriability of the innovations revenues on the
Þrms investment incentives. Most literature on R&D races focuses on in-
vestors incentives in a winner-take-all race. This is, however, an extreme
setting that needs not be realistic. We therefore study an R&D race in which
the winner does not necessarily take all the innovations revenues. In par-
ticular we introduce a Þxed share of the winners revenue that spills over to
the loser of the race. Such a revenue share can be implemented by two-part
licencing contracts with a royalty rate and a Þxed fee, as argued in Shapiro
(1985). The royalty rate keeps total the industrys revenue constant, while
the size of the Þxed fee determines the share of the revenue that the winner
of the race can appropriate.3 Revenue sharing introduces free-rider eﬀects to
the analysis that softens the R&D rivalry. These free-rider eﬀects interact in
an interesting way with the informational and strategic eﬀects.
The eﬀects for incentives of racing Þrms after the relaxation of the winner-
take-all assumption are studied in La Manna et al. (1989), Denicolò (1996),
Moldovanu and Sela (2000), and Palomino and Sákovics (2000). These pa-
2Illustrations of the informational eﬀect are given for the race for cold superconduc-
tivity, and biotech. Choi (1991) gives an example of the 1986 breakthrough in cold su-
perconductivity by IBM. This intermediate success increased the intensity of the race for
superconductivity. In the biotech industry Austen (1993) observes that an intermediate
success by one biotech Þrm leads to an increase in valuation of other Þrms in the industry.
3We make the extreme assumption that total industry revenues after licensing remains
constant to focus on free-rider eﬀects that softens R&D competition. More realistic in-
complete licensing contracts (e.g. contracts with non-negative fees, or contracts without
royalty rate) would introduce countervailing product market competition eﬀects that dis-
tort investment incentives. We ignore product market competition eﬀects to keep the
analysis tractable.
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pers seriously question the eﬃciency of races where the winner takes all, and
analyze the optimal allocation of prizes among the contestants of the race.
Our paper also Þnds that a positive revenue share softens investment com-
petition among Þrms, but in addition we study the consequences of revenue
sharing for information revelation and acquisition incentives.
After the eﬀects of intermediate information on investors incentives are
established, we endogenize the Þrms intermediate information in two ways.
First information is endogenous because Þrms can choose what information
they reveal. That is, the revelation of information is not exogenous, but a
strategic choice of the Þrms. Whether Þrms compete in R&D under public
or private information is now determined by the revelation strategies of the
Þrms. In particular we analyze how the Þrms incentives to reveal information
depend on the veriÞability of this information and on the appropriability of
revenues. When information is non-veriÞable, Þrms never completely reveal
their information, while there is an equilibrium in which they completely
conceal information. This result holds regardless of how Þrms share rev-
enues. These results are reversed for extreme revenue shares, however, when
information is veriÞable. Firms cannot credibly conceal any veriÞable infor-
mation, and will therefore fully disclose. For intermediate revenue shares
there is no equilibrium in which Þrms completely reveal their information.
The second way in which we endogenize the Þrms information is by as-
suming that each Þrm invests in costly information acquisition. Firms ex-
pectations in the R&D race depend both on the amount of information that
is revealed by their rivals, and on the amount of information that each Þrm
acquires. The incentives to acquire information depend on the appropriabil-
ity of both the acquired information, and the innovations revenues. When
the acquired information is public, Þrms have a low incentive to invest in
information acquisition, because they prefer to free ride on their rivals in-
formation acquisition investments. And when only part of the revenues from
innovation are appropriated by a Þrm, both negative as well as positive ex-
ternalities on information acquisition incentives exist between Þrms. The
negative eﬀect is due to the erosion of expected revenues from a Þrms own
information acquisition investments. This is a free-rider eﬀect. The positive
3
externality of revenue sharing is present when the Þrms acquired informa-
tion is public. The externality is caused by the fact that the information
generated by one Þrm aﬀects beliefs and consequently expected revenues of
the rival Þrm. Since part of these revenues spill over, Þrms have a bigger
incentive to invest in information acquisition.
Problems of strategic information revelation in R&D races are studied
in e.g. Bhattacharya et al. (1990, 1992), and Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998).
These papers are concerned with information revelation about the contents of
an intermediate innovation, where this information is not actively acquired
by the Þrms. These papers therefore put more emphasis on the strategic
eﬀect of information revelation. The literature on information sharing in
oligopoly studies the incentives of competing Þrm to share information with-
out spillovers of contents, see e.g. Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Fried
(1984), and Creane (1995) for papers with information acquisition.4 But this
literature mostly assumes that Þrms can commit ex ante whether to reveal
information or not. This is a strong assumption that need not always be
realistic. In fact, Ziv (1993) shows that the scope for information sharing
is drastically reduced when Þrms cannot commit ex ante and information is
non-veriÞable. We follow the same modelling approach as in the paper by
Ziv.
The interaction between information acquisition and subsequent compe-
tition is studied in Hendricks and Kovenock (1989), Choi (1991), Malueg
and Tsutsui (1997), Cyert and Kumar (1998), Dewatripont et al. (1999)
and Cripps et al. (2000). These papers study models in which Þrms learn
about their projects characteristics while they invest in it. In the former
four papers the acquired information is publicly observable, i.e. Þrms learn
from each others experience without cost. We show in this paper that Þrms
have incentives to misrepresent their intermediate information to aﬀect fu-
ture competition. Dewatripont et al. (1999) give suﬃcient conditions un-
der which a managers incentives for information acquisition investments are
aﬀected by an additional signal about his project. We perform a similar
exercise for signals that are generated by a Þrms rival. We extend the anal-
4For a recent survey on information sharing in oligopoly, see e.g. Raith (1996).
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ysis by introducing competition in information acquisition, and by studying
the eﬀects of imperfect appropriability of the inventors prize. Cripps et al.
(2000) compares experimenters incentives for information acquisition under
public and private signals, and focuses on the experimentation dynamics.
While some incentives eﬀects are related to ours, we add proÞt comparisons,
and analyze the strategic eﬀects of revenue sharing. In particular we show
that Þrms expected proÞts can be increased by relaxing the winner-takes-all
assumption.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the
basic model. In section 3 the total proÞt maximizing investments and proÞts
are characterized. This eﬃcient outcome serves as a benchmark. Section 4
analyzes the eﬀects of introducing competition in the winner-take-all race.
We compare the outcome of the race with public signals with the outcome
with private signals. In section 5 we analyze how the equilibrium investments
and proÞts change when the winner of the race shares part of his revenues
with the loser. The sixth section discusses how much information is revealed,
and consequently what investments are chosen, when Þrms reveal information
strategically. Section 7 discusses strategic information acquisition incentives
in the R&D race, and the last section concludes the paper. All proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Basic Model
We consider an industry in which two Þrms compete to obtain an innovation.
Firms have identical costs of investments, i.e. costs are perfectly positively
correlated. In the Þrst stage nature chooses the Þrms costs of investment and
sends a signal about it to the Þrms. In the second stage the Þrms actually
invest in R&D to obtain the innovation.5
At the beginning of the race Þrms do not know their cost of investment.
This cost is summarized by the parameter θ, which is either low, θ = θ, or
high, θ = θ with 0 < θ < θ. Firms have low (resp. high) costs of investment
5In later sections we will extend this model by introducing revenue sharing, revelation
strategies, and information acquisition investments. We introduce these model extensions
at the begining of the respective sections that discuss these payoﬀ structures and strategies.
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with probability p (resp. 1− p), with 0 < p < 1.
Firms learn imperfectly about their cost of investment by the following
signalling technology. When Þrms have high costs, nature always draws a
bad signal, ti = t, for i = 1, 2. When costs of investment are low, Þrm
is signal depends on precision parameter R. Firm i receives a good signal,
ti = t, with probability R, while the probability of a bad signal, ti = t, is
1 − R, with 0 < R < 1 and i = 1, 2. Signals are independently distributed
between Þrms conditional on the Þrms cost of investment. The Þrst-stage
stochastic structure for Þrm i is depicted in Figure 1 below. The dashed lines
represent Þrm is information sets.
ti = t
ti = t
³³
³³
³³³1
PPPPPPPq
θ
ti = t-θ
©©
©©
©©
©*
HHHHHHHj
θ
[p]
[1− p]
[R]
[1−R]
[1]
Figure 1: Þrm is signal
We make diﬀerent assumptions about the nature of the Þrms signals. In
particular we compare the outcome of a race where Þrms signals are public
information with the outcome of a race where signals are private information
to Þrms. This comparison is made in section 4. Besides the fact that this
comparison is interesting in itself, it also enables us to analyze a richer model
in which Þrms strategically choose how much information to reveal to their
rival. We introduce this extension to the model in section 6 of this paper.
The precision of Þrms signals will be endogenized in section 7 by assuming
that Þrms make costly information acquisition investments.
Whenever a Þrm receives a good signal, ti = t, it learns that both Þrms
have low costs of investment. Whenever both Þrms receive a bad public
signal, they are in one of the following situations. Either they have high costs
of investment, or Þrms have low costs and were simply unlucky. The extent
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to which Þrms were unlucky under a low cost project depends on precision
parameter R. The higher the signals precision, the more pessimistic Þrms
become about their cost of investment after receiving bad public signals.
After Þrms received their signals, they invest in R&D by spending Di ∈
[0, 1]. Firm is probability of obtaining an innovation is Di. In order to
keep the model manageable, we assume that Þrm is cost of investment is
quadratic in R&D investment Di, i.e. c(Di; θ) = 12θD
2
i , for i = 1, 2.
At the end of the race there are three possible outcomes for the Þrms.
The Þrst outcome is one in which only one Þrm develops the innovation.
The Þrm that develops the innovation, the winner, receives the winners
prize W , while the loser receives no revenue. The second outcome is one
in which both Þrms successfully develop the innovation. In that case each
Þrm receives prize T . Naturally, we assume that 0 ≤ T ≤ 1
2
W . If both
Þrms do not obtain the innovation, which is the third possible outcome, then
neither Þrm receives revenues. DeÞne ∆ ≡W − T as the diﬀerence between
the prizes of winning and tying. Note that our assumption on T implies
that 1
2
W ≤ ∆ ≤ W . Furthermore, we impose regularity condition θ > 2∆
to obtain interior solutions for Þrms R&D investments. The Þrms payoﬀ
structure is one in which the winner takes all. Although this is a common
assumption in the R&D race literature, it is not necessarily realistic. In
section 5 of the paper we analyze the eﬀects of relaxing this assumption by
introducing revenue sharing between the winner and loser of the race.
We assume that Þrms are risk-neutral. Given cost of investment θ and
R&D investments D ≡ (D1, D2), Þrm is expected proÞts are:
πi(D; θ) = DiDjT +Di(1−Dj)W − 1
2
θD2i (1)
= Di (W −∆Dj)− 1
2
θD2i .
Then Þrm is expected proÞt is as follows:
Πi(R,D) = Eθ{πi(D; θ)|R}. (2)
We solve the game backwards, and focus on symmetric, pure-strategy Bayes-
Nash equilibria.
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3 Benchmark: Eﬃcient R&D Investments
In this section we analyze the R&D investments that maximize expected total
industrys proÞts. It is eﬃcient for Þrms to receive public signals, since Þrms
can always choose to ignore a public signal. We use the eﬃcient outcome as
a benchmark to study the eﬀects of competition and private information on
equilibrium strategies.6
After nature chose parameter θ and the Þrms signals, to ≡ (t1, t2), there
are two basic states of the world. Either there is at least one Þrm that
received a good signal, to ∈ {(t, t), (t, t), (t, t)}, or both Þrms received a bad
signal, to ≡ (t, t). In the Þrst case both Þrms learn that they have a low cost
of investment, and therefore expect E(θ|to;R) = θ. In the latter case Þrms
cannot establish with certainty whether they will face a low or high cost of
investment, and have expected cost of investment E(θ|to;R) = θ + φ(R),
with:
φ(R) ≡ (1− p)(θ − θ)
p(1−R)2 + 1− p. (3)
In the eﬃcient outcome Þrm i chooses the investment that maximizes ex-
pected total proÞts, given the signals to ∈ {to, to} and precision parameter
R:
max
Di∈[0,1]
Eθ
(
2X
`=1
π`(D; θ)
¯¯¯¯
¯ to;R
)
, for i = 1, 2. (4)
The maximization gives the following Þrst-order conditions for investments:
E(θ|to;R)Di = W − 2Dj∆, for i, j = 1, 2, and j 6= i. (5)
Each Þrms investment creates a negative externality on its rivals investment
incentive. If Þrm i invests more in R&D, it becomes less likely that Þrm j will
be the winner of the race, which depresses its expected prize. Firms Þrst-
order conditions give the following eﬃcient investments and interim expected
proÞts for Þrm i, with i = 1, 2 and to ∈ {to, to}:
Di(to;R) =
W
E(θ|to;R) + 2∆ and πi(to;R) =
1
2
Di(to;R)W. (6)
6Such a benchmark could be relevant for policy analysis when Þrms can fully appro-
priate the social value of their innovation.
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Note that it is eﬃcient to invest less after observing (t, t) than after
observing a good signal, i.e. Di(to;R) > Di(to;R) for i = 1, 2. Two bad
signals make Þrms increasingly pessimistic about their costs of investment
when the signals precision grows, and therefore ∂Di(to;R)/∂R < 0, for
i = 1, 2.
For future use we deÞne Þrm is expected ex ante eﬃcient investments
and proÞts respectively as:
Di(R) ≡ p[1− (1−R)2]Di(to;R) + [p(1−R)2 + 1− p]Di(to;R), (7)
Πi(R) ≡ 1
2
Di(R)W. (8)
Finally we show how expected eﬃcient investments and proÞts depend on
the signals precision R. An increase in the signals precision has two oppos-
ing eﬀects on expected eﬃcient investments, as summarized in the following
expression:
D
0
i(R) = 2p(1−R)
¡
Di(to;R)−Di(to;R)
¢
+ [p(1−R)2 + 1− p]∂Di(to;R)
∂R
.
(9)
In case Þrms invest in a low-cost project, an increase in the signals precision
increases the Þrms probability of receiving a good signal. This direct eﬀect
increases the Þrms expected investments. On the other hand, in case Þrms
receive bad signals, an increase of precision makes them more pessimistic
about their cost of investment. This indirect eﬀect lowers the Þrms ex-
pected investments. It is easy to show that the direct eﬀect outweighs the
indirect eﬀect. Therefore the expected eﬃcient investments and proÞts are
monotonically increasing in the precision of the public signals, i.e. D
0
i(R) > 0
and Π
0
i(R) > 0. We summarize our results in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The eﬃcient R&D investments are such that, for all R and i =
1, 2: (i) Investments after a good signal exceed those after two bad signals:
Di(to;R) > Di(to;R); (ii) Investments after two bad signals decrease, while
ex ante expected investments increase in the signals precision: ∂Di(to;R)/∂R <
0, while D
0
i(R) > 0; (iii) Ex ante expected eﬃcient proÞts increase monoton-
ically in the signals precision: Π
0
i(R) > 0.
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4 Winner-Take-All Race
In this section we analyze investment incentives and proÞts of competing
Þrms. We compare the equilibrium of the race with public signals, with the
equilibrium of the race with private signals.
4.1 Public Signals
In this subsection we analyze the equilibrium of the R&D race where signals
to are publicly observable. We derive equilibrium investments and proÞts of
noncooperative Þrms, and analyze how they relate to the eﬃcient outcome.
The qualitative properties of equilibrium R&D investments and proÞts
are identical to those of the eﬃcient outcome. After observing the signals,
to, and given precision R, Þrm i chooses the investment that maximize its
expected proÞt. This gives the following Þrst-order conditions:
E(θ|to;R)Di = W −Dj∆, for i, j = 1, 2, and j 6= i, (10)
with E(θ|to;R) = θ, and E(θ|to;R) = θ + φ(R).
The following equilibrium investments and interim expected proÞts result
from both Þrms Þrst-order conditions:
bDi(to;R) = W
E(θ|to;R) +∆ and bπi(to;R) = 12E(θ|to;R) bDi(to;R)2, (11)
for all to, R and i = 1, 2. The qualitative properties for eﬃcient investments,
as summarized in lemma 1 (i)-(ii), also hold for these equilibrium investments.
The quantitative comparison between eﬃcient and equilibrium invest-
ments gives overinvestment: bDi(to;R) > Di(to;R) for all to, R and i = 1, 2.
Competing Þrms invest more in R&D, because they do not internalize the
negative eﬀect of their own R&D investments on their rivals expected rev-
enues. Firm is investment Di marginally decreases Þrm js revenue with
Dj∆. Therefore Þrms invest more aggressively than is eﬃcient. This is a
common observation in the literature on R&D races.
Firm is ex ante expected equilibrium investment and proÞt are as follows:
bDi(R) ≡ p[1− (1−R)2] bDi(to;R) + [p(1−R)2 + 1− p] bDi(to;R), (12)bΠi(R) ≡ p[1− (1−R)2]bπi(to;R) + [p(1−R)2 + 1− p]bπi(to;R). (13)
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When we compare this proÞt with the Þrms ex ante expected eﬃcient proÞt,
we observe the following. First, the negative externality makes expected
equilibrium proÞts strictly lower than the eﬃcient expected proÞts. Second,
competing Þrms trade oﬀ qualitatively similar eﬀects after the signals pre-
cision increases as total-proÞt maximizing Þrms do. The eﬀects on expected
proÞts are summarized in the following expression:
bΠ0i(R) = p(1−R)θ ³ bDi(to;R)2 − bDi(to;R)2´+
+[p(1−R)2 + 1− p](θ + φ(R)) bDi(to;R)∂ bDi(to;R)
∂R
. (14)
Again the positive direct eﬀect dominates the negative indirect eﬀect, i.e.bΠ0i(R) > 0 for all R.
We summarize the subsections Þndings in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Public Signals) Firm i with public signals overinvests in equi-
librium: bDi(to;R) > Di(to;R) for all to and R, with i = 1, 2. Ex ante equilib-
rium proÞts are strictly lower than eﬃcient expected proÞts: bΠi(R) < Πi(R)
for all R. Moreover all qualitative properties of lemma 1 hold true forbDi(to;R), bDi(R), and bΠi(R) as well.
4.2 Private Signals
In this subsection we derive the equilibrium investments and proÞts under the
assumption that signals are private information to the Þrms and cannot be
revealed to rivals. We compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium under
public signals.
With private signals, the following reaction functions determine the Þrms
equilibrium R&D investments (with i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j):
θ eDi(t;R) = W − ³R eDj(t;R) + (1−R) eDj(t;R)´∆, (15)
(θ + ϕ(R)) eDi(t;R) = W − ³P (R) eDj(t;R) + [1− P (R)] eDj(t;R)´∆(16)
with
ϕ(R) =
(1− p)(θ − θ)
1− pR and P (R) =
p(1−R)R
1− pR . (17)
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We Þrst establish that the qualitative properties of lemma 1 (i)-(ii) also
hold for equilibrium investments under private signals. A Þrm with a good
private signal is more optimistic about its expected costs of investment, but
expects Þercer competition than a Þrm with a bad signal. Since the cost
eﬀect outweighs the competition eﬀect, Þrms with a bad private signal invest
less than Þrms with a good private signal.
The equilibrium investments depend on the signals precision R in the
following way. A Þrm with a good signal expects a more optimistic rival
after the signals precision increases, which depresses the Þrms investments.
A Þrm that receives a bad signal, trades oﬀ the following conßicting eﬀects.
On the one hand, an increase in the signals precision makes the Þrm more
pessimistic about the costs of investment, i.e. ϕ(R) increases, which lowers
its investments. On the other hand, the Þrm expects weaker competition, i.e.
P (R) decreases, which encourages its investments. Again the negative cost
eﬀect outweighs the positive competition eﬀect. Therefore Þrms equilibrium
investments decrease in the signals precision.
For the comparison of equilibrium R&D investments of Þrms with private
and public signals we observe the following. Privately informed Þrms can
condition their R&D investments only on their own signal. A good signal
received by one Þrm does not imply that both Þrms become optimistic about
the cost of investment. It is possible that the other Þrm is unlucky and
receives a bad signal. Therefore the expected rival to a Þrm with a good
private signal is less aggressive than the rival to a Þrm with a good public
signal. This makes equilibrium investments of a Þrm with a good private
signal exceed those of a Þrm with a good public signal: eDi(t;R) ≥ bDi(to;R)
for all R.
Now consider the situation in which nature chose two bad signals, to =
(t, t). For each Þrm there are two conßicting eﬀects when we turn from a
public to a private bad signal. On the one hand a Þrm with only one bad
signal is more optimistic about costs of investment, because it does not pool
information with his rival. On the other hand, the privately informed Þrm
expects a more aggressive rival since the rival could be optimistic. The Þrst
eﬀect encourages, while the second eﬀect discourages investments. The direct
12
cost eﬀect outweighs the indirect competition eﬀect. Therefore a Þrm with a
private bad signal invests more in R&D than a Þrm with public bad signals:eDi(t;R) > bDi(to;R) for all R.
From these observations we cannot conclude that overall Þrms with pri-
vate signals invest more in R&D than Þrms with public signals. In the race
with public signals the Þrms likelihood of receiving a good signal is bigger
than in the race with private signals. Although Þrms equilibrium invest-
ments are higher given a private signal, the higher likelihood of receiving
a good public signal makes expected equilibrium investments with public
signals higher: eDi(R) < bDi(R), for all R, where
eDi(R) ≡ pR eDi(t;R) + (1− pR) eDi(t;R). (18)
That is, overall the expected equilibrium investments for Þrms with public
signals are higher than those with privately observable signals.
We summarize our Þndings on equilibrium investments in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 (Investments) In the race with private signals equilibrium
R&D investments are such that, for i = 1, 2:
Given received signals, Þrms invest more after receiving a private signal than
after receiving public signals: eDi(t;R) > bDi(to;R) and eDi(t;R) > bDi(to;R),
for all R. However, for the ex ante expected equilibrium investments the
reverse holds: eDi(R) < bDi(R). Moreover, the qualitative properties of lemma
1 (i)-(ii) also hold for eDi(ti;R) and eDi(R).
In the remainder of this section we analyze how expected equilibrium
proÞts compare. First we compare the Þrms interim expected proÞts. The
interim expected proÞts of a Þrm with private signals are as follows:
eπi(ti;R) = 1
2
E(θ|ti;R) eDi(ti;R)2, (19)
where E(θ|t;R) = θ and E(θ|t;R) = θ + ϕ(R). A Þrm that received a good
signal invests less in the equilibrium of the race with public signals than in the
race with private signals, and expects the same cost parameter E(θ|t;R) = θ
in both races. Therefore a Þrm with a good public signal expects lower
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proÞts than a Þrm with a good private signal: bπi(to;R) < eπi(t;R). If both
Þrms receive bad signals, there are two conßicting factors in their expected
proÞt functions. On the one hand each Þrm invests less in the equilibrium
of the race with public signals than in the race with private signals. On the
other hand each Þrm is more pessimistic about cost parameter θ in the race
with public signals, i.e. φ(R) > ϕ(R). Therefore the proÞt comparison for
pessimistic Þrms is not obvious. We obtain that if θ ≥ 3∆, the expected
equilibrium proÞts in the race with public bad signals are lower than those
in the race with private bad signals: bπi(to;R) < eπi(t;R).
Second, we compare the Þrms ex ante expected proÞts under public and
private signals. Firm is ex ante expected equilibrium proÞt of receiving
private signals is as follows:
eΠi(R) ≡ pReπi(t;R) + (1− pR)eπi(t;R). (20)
If θ ≥ 3∆, then Þrms expect higher proÞts from a more informative sig-
nal, i.e. eΠ0i(R) > 0. When we compare this eΠi(R) with bΠi(R) we observe
two conßicting eﬀects. For given signals and θ ≥ 3∆, Þrms expect higher
interim equilibrium proÞts in the race with private signals. This favors ex
ante expected equilibrium proÞts in the race with private signals. However
the probability of receiving a good public signal, and consequently expect-
ing high equilibrium proÞts, is greater in the race with public signals. This
eﬀect beneÞts Þrmss expected equilibrium proÞts in the race with public
signals. The trade-oﬀ between the two eﬀects is summarized in part (ii) of
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Profits) (i) If θ ≥ 3∆, Þrms that receive a private sig-
nal expect higher proÞts than Þrms that receive public signals: eπi(t;R) >bπi(to;R), and eπi(t;R) > bπi(to;R) for all R and i = 1, 2. (ii.a) If 3∆ <
θ < (2 +
√
3)∆ and θ suﬃciently small, there are critical precisions R0 and
R00 with 0 < R0 ≤ R00 < 1 such that bΠi(R) < eΠi(R) for all R ≤ R0, whilebΠi(R) > eΠi(R) for all R ≥ R00. (ii.b) If θ ≥ (2 +√3)∆, Þrms expect higher
proÞts in the race with public signals than in the race with private signals,
i.e. bΠi(R) > eΠi(R) for all R. Moreover, if θ ≥ 3∆, the qualitative property
of lemma 1 (iii) also holds for eΠi(R).
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The expected proÞt comparisons would indicate the Þrms incentives to
share information, if each Þrm could commit to share before it receives its
signal. In section 6 we study whether Þrms actually share information after
they received their signals.
5 Revenue Sharing
So far we assumed that in the race the winner takes all. This is, however, only
an extreme way of distributing revenues from the innovation among Þrms. In
this section we assume that the loser of the race gets a share of the revenues
from the winner. In an R&D race revenue sharing can be implemented by
license agreements between competitors, see e.g. Shapiro (1985). We show
that revenue sharing introduces free-rider incentives in the R&D investment
stage, which reduces overinvestments. The eﬀects of revenue sharing on R&D
feed back in the Þrms incentives for information revelation and acquisition
incentives, as we show in subsequent sections.
We assume that the loser of the race receives share σ of the revenues from
the winner. Hence the winner of the race receives prize (1− σ)W , while the
loser receives the remainder of the prize, i.e. σW , with 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1. Observe
that for σ = 0, we are in the winner-take-all race, while for σ = 1
2
Þrms
share the prize equally.
Given revenue share σ and cost parameter θ R&D proÞts are:
πi(D; θ|σ) = DiDjT +Di(1−Dj)(1− σ)W + (1−Di)DjσW − 1
2
θD2i
= Di((1− σ)W −∆Dj)− 1
2
θD2i +DjσW. (21)
This changes Þrst-order conditions for R&D investments into:
E(θ|t`, R)Di = (1− σ)W − Et`(Dj|t`, R)∆, (22)
with E(θ|t`, R) and Et`(Dj|t`, R) the expected costs and expected rivals in-
vestment, respectively, for ` ∈ {o, i}, i, j,= 1, 2 and i 6= j. Note that marginal
expected revenues are reduced by σW due to revenue sharing, while marginal
costs remain the same. Therefore, equilibrium R&D investments decrease in
the revenue share σ. The marginal eﬀect of Þrm is R&D investment on Þrm
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js expected proÞts is now σW−Dj∆. Hence the negative externality −Dj∆
of the winner-take-all race is reduced by σW . Sharing revenues makes Þrms
less aggressive competitors, because their proÞts are more interdependent.
In equilibrium the R&D investments and proÞts relate as follows to the
winner-take-all equilibrium investments and proÞts:7
Di(.|σ) = (1− σ)Di(.), and (23)
πi(.|σ) = (1− σ)[(1− σ)πi(.) + σWEt (Dj|.)]. (24)
for i = 1, 2. Equilibrium investments are monotonously decreasing in the
revenue share. Initially revenue sharing decreases overinvestments, which in-
creases equilibrium proÞts. A further increase in the revenue share results
in equilibrium underinvestments, which decreases proÞts. Therefore, equi-
librium proÞts are initially increasing, and subsequently decreasing in the
revenue share. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Interim) The following holds both for races with public
and for races with private signals, for all t and R. (i) Equilibrium investments
decrease in the revenue share: ∂Di(.|σ)/∂σ < 0 for all σ < 1. (ii) Equilib-
rium proÞts initially increase in σ, and subsequently drop to zero: there is a
share σ0 ∈ (0, 1
2
) s.t. ∂πi(.|σ)/∂σ > 0 for all σ < σ0 and ∂πi(.|σ)/∂σ < 0 for
all σ > σ0 for all t and R.
When Þrms share revenues, Þrm is ex ante expected equilibrium proÞt
is as follows:
Πi(R|σ) = (1− σ) [(1− σ)Πi(R) + σWDj(R)] , (25)
The expected revenue spillover from each Þrms rival increases in the signals
precision, i.e. D0j(R) > 0, as we saw in the previous section. Therefore, if
θ ≥ 3∆, the expected equilibrium proÞts are monotonically increasing in the
precision of the signals, i.e. ∂Πi(R|σ)/∂R > 0 for all R.
Although the Þrms revenue share is exogenously determined, it is instruc-
tive to check whether the eﬃcient proÞt level can be obtained by revenue
7Since for most of this section the characterizations of equilibrium proÞts and invest-
ments are qualitatively identical for the races with public and private signals, we drop the
decorations and arguments of equilibrium investment and proÞt functions.
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sharing. For each precision of the signals R, we can calculate the maximally
attainable expected equilibrium proÞts from revenue sharing. We do this by
inserting the proÞt maximizing revenue share σ(R) in the proÞt function.
It is easily veriÞed, and shown in proposition 3, that 2Πi(R) < Dj(R), and
therefore the proÞt maximizing revenue share equals:
σ(R) =
Dj(R)W − 2Πi(R)
2 [Dj(R)W − Πi(R)] . (26)
The proÞt maximizing revenue share creates a race that is strictly between
winner-take-all and equal-sharing, i.e. 0 < σ(R) < 1
2
. After we substitute
σ(R) in the expected proÞt function, we obtain the maximally attainable
equilibrium proÞts:
Πi (R|σ(R)) = Dj(R)
2W 2
4 [Dj(R)W − Πi(R)] . (27)
If θ ≥ 3∆, these maximum expected proÞts compare as follows for all R:eΠi(R|eσ(R)) < bΠi(R|bσ(R)) < Πi(R), (28)
The fact that eΠi(R|eσ(R)) < bΠi(R|bσ(R)) does, however, not imply that for a
given revenue share σ publicly informed Þrms expect higher equilibrium prof-
its than privately informed Þrms. An illustration of this fact was presented in
the previous section for the winner-take-all race, see e.g. proposition 2 (ii.a).
For all R the maximally attainable equilibrium proÞts are strictly below the
eﬃcient expected proÞts, as we show in the following proposition. Revenue
sharing can therefore never implement the eﬃcient outcome.
Proposition 4 (Ex ante) (i) Irrespective of whether signals are public and
private information, expected proÞts are maximized in a race that is strictly
between winner-take-all and equal-sharing: 0 < σ(R) < 1
2
for all R. (ii.a)
Firms expected equilibrium proÞts are always strictly lower than the expected
eﬃcient proÞts: max
nbΠi(R|σ), eΠi(R|σ)o < Πi(R) for all σ and R. (ii.b) In
particular, if θ ≥ 3∆, then the maximal expected proÞts for a Þrm with public
signals exceeds the maximal expected proÞts of a Þrm with private signals:eΠi(R|eσ(R)) < bΠi(R|bσ(R)), for all R. (iii) Moreover, if θ ≥ 3∆, then for any
revenue share the qualitative property of lemma 1 (iii) also holds for ex ante
expected equilibrium proÞts.
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6 Strategic Revelation
In this section we extend the basic model by adding an information revela-
tion stage. After Þrms received their private signal, each Þrm chooses what
information to reveal. Subsequently Þrms invest in R&D. Firms have an in-
centive to manipulate their information in order to alter their rivals beliefs,
and consequently change R&D competition in their favor.
We make two distinct informational assumptions. We analyze what in-
formation Þrms reveal when signals are non-veriÞable in the next subsection.
The second subsection studies how Þrms incentives and possibilities to reveal
information are aﬀected when information is costlessly veriÞable.
6.1 Non-veriÞable Information
In this subsection we assume that Þrms cannot verify the truthfulness of
their rivals messages. Since information is non-veriÞable, Þrms can make any
statement about their signal they like. Formally, after each Þrm received its
private signal, Þrms simultaneously choose their revelation rules (τ i(t), τ i(t)),
with τ i(ti) ∈ {t, t}, and reveal information bti ∈ {τ i(ti)|ti = t, t} accordingly.
We assume that Þrms revelation rules do not depend on the signals precision
R. For example, revelation rule (τ i(t), τ i(t)) ≡ (t, t) gives truthful revelation,
while rules (τ i(t), τ i(t)) ≡ (t, t) and (t, t) do not reveal any information to
the rival Þrm. After messages are sent, Þrms simultaneously invest in R&D.
A natural Þrst step of analysis is to see whether Þrms voluntarily reveal
all their information in equilibrium. This would give us R&D investments of
the race with public signals. First consider the winner-take-all race. In this
race each Þrm has an incentive to make its rival invest as little as possible.
If it is expected that a Þrm fully reveals its information, then this Þrm has
an incentive to always send bad news, i.e. it always states bti = t. The rival
believes this is truthfully revealed information, and becomes pessimistic. The
pessimistic rival invests little in R&D, which increases the expected proÞt
of the sender of bad news. Second, consider the equal-sharing race where
Þrms believe that their rival fully reveals information. In an equal-sharing
race each Þrm has an incentive to make his rivals investments as big as
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possible in order to take a free ride on those investments. Then a Þrm has
an incentive to always send good news. The Þrms rival believes that t was
observed, and becomes optimistic about the costs of investment. The rivals
investments increase, and the sender of good news takes a free ride on these
high investments. Similar incentives to under- or overstate signals exist for
other revenue shares. And full disclosure does never happen in equilibrium,
as is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (No Full Revelation) For all revenue shares σ ∈ [0, 1],
there does not exist an equilibrium of the game with strategic revelation of
non-veriÞable information in which signals are fully revealed.
The polar case of complete revelation is no revelation of any informa-
tion. No revelation of information can always be sustained as an equilibrium.
Given that the statements of Þrms contain no information whatsoever, Þrms
ignore them. Since statements are ignored, neither truthful nor false state-
ments aﬀect rivals investments. Therefore Þrms are indiﬀerent between all
statements, and it is optimal to choose the non-revealing rule that is consis-
tent with equilibrium beliefs. This is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (No Revelation) There is an equilibrium of the game with
strategic revelation of non-veriÞable information in which no information
is revealed for any revenue share σ ∈ [0, 1].
This result is similar to that of Ziv (1993), and is standard for models
with non-veriÞable signals. The paper by Ziv focuses on the incentives of
Cournot duopolists to understate costs of producing homogeneous products.
In our analysis we consider a situation in which revenue sharing aﬀects Þrms
incentives. And we show that irrespective of how Þrms share the revenue from
innovation, they never reveal their information.
Our contribution is here to show that even for intermediate revenue shares
Þrms incentives are not aligned. Depending on how much of the revenue is
shared between Þrms, Þrms have an incentive to give less (low σ), more (high
σ), or both less and more (intermediate σ) favorable information to the rivals.
Although ex ante expected proÞts are often higher for Þrms that invest with
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public signals, Þrms cannot reach this equilibrium by strategically revealing
non-veriÞable signals.
An interesting extension to this sections analysis would be to study
whether there are revenue shares for which Þrms reveal some information
in equilibrium. Such an analysis awaits future research.
6.2 VeriÞable Information
In the previous subsection we assumed that Þrms can costlessly misrepre-
sent their private signals. Therefore credible revelation of information is not
possible in equilibrium. A natural question to ask is how the results change
when information is costlessly veriÞable. The only choice that a Þrm with
veriÞable information has, is to either disclose its information or conceal
it. That is, Þrms simultaneously choose revelation rules (τ i(t), τ i(t)), with
τ i(ti) ∈ {ti,∅} for ti ∈ {t, t} and i = 1, 2.
The seminal paper by Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) gives suﬃcient con-
ditions on Þrms strategic interaction and information under which an equi-
librium with full disclosure of private information with sceptical inferences
exists. For our R&D race neither suﬃcient condition 4c nor 4d from Okuno-
Fujiwara et al. (1990) are met. Assumption 4c (resp. 4d) states that as a
Þrms signal increases, his reaction curve shifts out (resp. in) while his rivals
reaction function shifts in (resp. out) or stays the same.
In our model Þrms signals, and expected proÞts, are correlated. There-
fore Þrm is marginal expected proÞt is non-increasing both in its own and
its rivals signal. The negative relationship between a Þrms disclosure and
its own marginal proÞt is a strategic eﬀect. After disclosing veriÞable good
news, a Þrm discloses to be an aggressive investor, which shifts out its reac-
tion function. The negative relationship between a Þrms signal and its rivals
marginal proÞt is caused by the informational eﬀect of disclosure. Disclosure
of good news by one Þrm makes the Þrms rival more optimistic which shifts
out his reaction function.
The violation of the suﬃcient conditions for complete revelation raises
the question whether the unraveling result still holds. Okuno-Fujiwara
et al. discuss a common value example in which neither condition 4c nor
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4d is satisÞed, but full disclosure is still established. The result is obtained
here because the strategic eﬀect dominates the informational eﬀect. In our
model the informational eﬀect dominates the strategic eﬀect, and we obtain a
similar result for extreme revenue shares. However for intermediate revenue
shares unraveling does not occur.
Proposition 6 (Verifiable Information) If Þrms signals are costlessly
veriÞable after revelation, then there are revenue shares σ and σ , with 0 <
σ < σ < 1, such that:
(i) for σ ≤ σ Þrms fully disclose in equilibrium with skeptical inferences,
(ii) for σ < σ < σ no inferences support full disclosure in equilibrium,
(iii) for σ > σ Þrms fully disclose in equilibrium with skeptical inferences.
For low (resp. high) revenue shares Þrms have an incentive to disclose
only bad (resp. good) news. A Þrms rival anticipates this and knows that
a concealing Þrms cost signal is low (resp. high). This evaporates a Þrms
possibilities to eﬀectively conceal information. The veriÞability of Þrms in-
formation enables a Þrm to unravel its rivals private information, as in Gross-
man (1981) and Milgrom (1982). This result is the opposite of our results
on revelation in the previous subsection. For non-veriÞable signals Þrms can-
not credibly reveal any information, while for veriÞable signals Þrms cannot
credibly conceal information from their rival.
In races with intermediate revenue shares complete disclosure is not an
equilibrium strategy. Since both the optimistic and pessimistic investors
have an incentive to misrepresent their signals, full disclosure is not chosen
in equilibrium. A Þrm that received a bad signal has an incentive to conceal
since it makes its rival more optimistic about the costs of investment. The
rival will invest more in R&D, and the concealing Þrm can take a free ride
on these higher investments. A Þrm with a good signal has an incentive to
conceal information, and discourage its rival in the investment stage. For
the good-signal Þrm the informational eﬀect outweighs the free-rider eﬀect.
A similar result is found in a diﬀerent setting by Hendricks and Kovenock
(1989).
The results of this section indicate that the assumption of publicly ob-
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servable signals, as in Choi (1991) and Malueg and Tsutsui (1997), need not
always be sustainable as Þrms equilibrium strategies. When the assumption
is relaxed and signals can be costlessly misrepresented, complete revelation
no longer happens in equilibrium. With veriÞable signals public signals are a
proper assumption if revenue shares are extremely low or high. The amount
of information that can and will be shared among Þrms crucially depends
on the veriÞability of this information, and on the appropriability of the
innovations revenues.
7 Strategic Information Acquisition
In sections 3-6 we showed that generically Þrms would increase their expected
proÞts if they could increase the precision of their signals. This section
discusses individual Þrms incentives to invest in acquiring a more informative
signal, i.e. we endogenize the signals precision. Whether signals are public or
private does not only aﬀect Þrms incentives to invest in R&D, but also aﬀects
incentives to acquire those signals. This section studies how the information
acquisition investments interact with the R&D investments.
Instead of assuming that the Þrms signals are of exogenous precision, we
assume that each Þrm invests Ri ∈ [0, 1] in receiving a signal from nature. If
the Þrms have low costs of investment, and Þrm i invests Ri in information
acquisition, it receives signal ti = t with probability Ri. Firm is cost of
information acquisition is c(Ri) = 12ρR
2
i . For convenience, and relevance, we
assume that these investments are unobservable. Firm i expects information
acquisition investment rj from Þrm j. The sequence of moves is as follows.
After nature chooses the cost of R&D investment, Þrms simultaneously invest
in information acquisition. After the Þrms received their signals they invest
in R&D. We compare Þrms information acquisition incentives for the race
with public signals with those for the race with private signals.
7.1 Eﬃcient Information Acquisition
Eﬃcient information acquisition investments maximize the sum of ex ante
expected eﬃcient proÞts. Firm is Þrst-order condition of this maximization
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problem, after the subsequent imposition of symmetry on investments (Ri =
R), is as follows:8
ρR = p(1−R)
Ã
2X
`=1
π`
¡
D(to;R); θ
¢− 2X
`=1
π`
¡
D(to;R); θ
¢!
. (29)
This Þrst-order condition determines Þrm is eﬃcient information acquisition
investment Ri. That is, marginal costs equal marginal revenues of informa-
tion acquisition investments. Marginal costs are the direct cost of information
acquisition investment, ρR. The marginal revenue of information acquisition
is the total proÞt gained from obtaining a good signal and Þnding out that
costs of investment are low after investing a marginal amount more.
7.2 Public Signal Information Acquisition
In the race with public signals each Þrm chooses the information acquisi-
tion investment that maximizes its expected proÞt, given equilibrium R&D
investments. Firm is Þrst-order condition for proÞt-maximization, with sym-
metric investments (i.e. Ri = R) and realized expectations (i.e. ri = R), is
as follows:
ρR = max
n
0, (1− σ)
³
(1− σ)dMR(R) + σdMQ(R)´o , (30)
with
dMR(R) ≡ p(1−R) hπi ³ bD(to;R); θ´− πi ³ bD(to;R); θ´i , and (31)dMQ(R) ≡ p(1−R)W h bDj(to;R)− bDj(to;R)i . (32)
The two terms of Þrm is marginal revenues represent the following two eﬀects
of information acquisition. The Þrst term captures the marginal increase
in revenue after more information acquisition results in discovering a low
cost of investment. This term is similar to the marginal revenue of eﬃcient
information acquisition. The second term represents the change in revenue
that Þrm i expects to receive from its rival after making him more optimistic
8See the Appendix for the derivation of this condition.
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by acquiring a good signal for the industry. Firm is second-order condition
for equilibrium information acquisition investments is expression (48) in the
Appendix. The investment bRi(σ) that satisÞes both the Þrst- and second-
order conditions is Þrm is equilibrium information acquisition investment.
In the winner-take-all race (σ = 0) Þrms underinvest in information ac-
quisition. If Þrm i acquires a good signal, this improves both its own and its
rivals expected proÞt, since the signal is public and Þrms learn from each
others signal. This gives Þrms an incentive to free-ride on their rivals infor-
mation acquisition investment, and underinvest in equilibrium as is stated in
proposition 7 (i).
When we increase the Þrms revenue share (σ > 0), this has the follow-
ing conßicting eﬀects on the Þrms information acquisition incentives. On
the one hand the revenue share internalizes a fraction of the positive ex-
ternality from information acquisition. The internalization of the free-rider
eﬀect in acquiring public signals increases Þrms information acquisition in-
centives. However, an increase in the revenue share diminishes the Þrms
incentives to invest in R&D, and consequently their marginal information
acquisition revenues. The creation of a free-rider eﬀect in R&D decreases
the Þrms incentives to acquire information. The equilibrium information ac-
quisition investment depends on the trade-oﬀ between these two conßicting
eﬀects. Initially the positive eﬀect of revenue sharing dominates, while for
a suﬃciently big revenue share the negative eﬀect dominates. Therefore the
equilibrium information acquisition investment initially increases and subse-
quently decreases as Þrms share more of their revenues. Whether there is a
revenue share such that the equilibrium information acquisition investment
rises above the eﬃcient investment depends on parameter values. This is
summarized in proposition 7 (ii).
Revenue sharing aﬀects the Þrms incentives to acquire information, as
well as incentives to invest in R&D. This raises the question what the overall
eﬀect of revenue sharing on the Þrms ex ante expected equilibrium proÞts is.
Firm is expected equilibrium proÞt given equilibrium information acquisition
and R&D investments is deÞned as follows:
bΠi (σ) ≡ bΠi ³ bR(σ)¯¯¯ σ´ . (33)
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The eﬀect of revenue sharing on expected proÞt can be decomposed as follows:
bΠ0i (σ) = ∂bΠi
³ bR(σ)¯¯¯ σ´
∂R
· bR0(σ) + ∂bΠi
³ bR(σ)¯¯¯ σ´
∂σ
(34)
Proposition 4 already shows that expected proÞts are increasing in the sig-
nals precision, i.e. ∂bΠi (R|σ) /∂R > 0. Moreover in the previous paragraph
we established that the equilibrium information acquisition investment ini-
tially increases and subsequently decreases in the revenue share. This implies
that the Þrst term of expression (34) is positive for low revenue shares, and
negative for high revenue shares. For the second term of expression (34) we
observed in proposition 3 that proÞts are initially increasing in the revenue
share and subsequently decreasing. When we add the two terms we conclude
that for suﬃciently low revenue shares expected ex ante proÞts increase after
an increase in the revenue share, while for suﬃciently high revenue shares
expected proÞts decrease in the revenue share. Therefore there is an interme-
diate revenue share that maximizes expected ex ante proÞts. This is stated
in part (iii) of the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the second-order condition for information ac-
quisition is satisÞed. (i) Equilibrium information acquisition investments in
the winner-take-all race with public signals do not exceed the eﬃcient invest-
ments: Ri ≥ bRi(0) for i = 1, 2. (ii) There are revenue shares bσI0, bσI1, with
0 < bσI0 ≤ bσI1 < 1, such that equilibrium information acquisition investments
are non-decreasing for all σ < bσI0 and decreasing for all σ > bσI1. In particu-
lar, if E(θ) >
q
2(θ2 + 2θ∆+ 2∆2), then Ri ≥ bRi(σ) for all σ and i = 1, 2.
(iii) There are critical values bσII0 and bσII1 with 0 < bσII0 ≤ bσII1 < 1 such thatbΠi (σ) increases in σ for all σ ≤ bσII0 , and decreases in σ for all σ ≥ bσII1 .
Total proÞts are increased by introducing a positive revenue share in the
winner-take-all race. On the one hand, the introduction of payoﬀ spillovers
reduces Þrms overinvestments in R&D. On the other hand, these payoﬀ
spillovers initially stimulate the acquisition of informative public signals,
and therefore reduces the Þrms underinvestment in information acquisition.
Since both overinvestments in R&D and underinvestments in information
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acquisition are reduced, total proÞt is increased. For big revenue shares the
free-rider incentives are dominating in the industry, and expected proÞts drop
to zero.
7.3 Private Signal Information Acquisition
We now turn to the race where Þrms acquire private signals. Since signals are
private, Þrms can no longer free-ride on each others information acquisition
investments. The Þrst-order condition for Þrm is equilibrium information
acquisition investment is, after substitution of the equilibrium condition Ri =
ri = R, as follows:
ρR = (1− σ)2p
n
πi
³ eDi(t;R), R eDj(t;R) + (1−R) eDj(t;R); θ´
−πi
³ eDi(t;R), R eDj(t;R) + (1−R) eDj(t;R); θ´o . (35)
Investments that obey this Þrst-order condition trade oﬀ the marginal cost of
information acquisition against its marginal revenue. The marginal revenue
of information acquisition, at the right hand side of expression (35), is the
expected proÞt gain of discovering that the cost of investment is low. The
second-order condition for proÞt maximization can be found as expression
(51) in the Appendix. The investment eRi(σ) for which both the Þrst- and
second-order conditions are satisÞed, is Þrm is equilibrium investment.
First we analyze the Þrms incentives to acquire private signals in the
winner-take-all race. Since Þrms cannot free-ride on their rivals investment
to acquire private signals, Þrms invest more in acquiring private signals than
in acquiring public signals. This fact has a consequence for the comparison
between ex ante expected proÞts. In proposition 2 (ii) we showed that for
each given signals precision, and for big enough costs of investment, Þrms
expect higher equilibrium proÞts in the race with public signals than in the
race with private signals. This inequality need no longer hold in the races
with endogenous precisions of signals. On the one hand we have shown that
generically bΠi( bR) > eΠi( bR). But on the other hand Þrms invest more thanbR in information acquisition in the race with private signals, i.e. eR > bR,
which increases Þrm is expected proÞts in the race with private signals,
and therefore eΠi( eR) > eΠi( bR). The sign of the diﬀerence between expected
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proÞt bΠi( bR) and eΠi( eR) is therefore ambiguous. We state these Þndings in
proposition 8 (i).
Finally we discuss the eﬀects of revenue sharing on the incentive to ac-
quire private signals, and on expected proÞts. A change in Þrm is acquired
signal does not change its rivals R&D investments, since signals are private
to the Þrms. Firm is incentive to invest in acquiring a private signal now
only depends on the appropriability of its own R&D revenue. The more rev-
enue spills over to the rival, the less valuable its own information acquisition
becomes for the Þrm. Therefore we observe that each Þrms equilibrium in-
formation acquisition investment decreases in the revenue share σ. We state
this formally in proposition 8 (ii).
The eﬀect of a change in the revenue share on expected proÞts is decom-
posed in the following fashion:
eΠ0i (σ) = ∂eΠi
³ eR(σ)¯¯¯ σ´
∂R
· eR0(σ) + ∂eΠi
³ eR(σ)¯¯¯ σ´
∂σ
, (36)
with eΠi (σ) ≡ eΠi ³ eR(σ)¯¯¯σ´. We know that the Þrst term of expression
(36) is negative for all revenue shares, since eΠi (R|σ) increases in the signals
precision, while eR(σ) decreases in the revenue share. The second term is
positive for small revenue shares, and negative for big revenue shares. These
two simple observations imply that the sign of the sum of these two terms is
ambiguous for small revenue shares, but deÞnitely negative for big revenue
shares. We summarize our Þndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the second-order condition for information ac-
quisition holds. (i) In the winner-take-all race (σ = 0) Þrms invest in equi-
librium more in acquiring private than public signals: eRi(0) ≥ bRi(0). How
expected proÞts bΠi( bR) and eΠi( eR) compare is ambiguous. (ii) Information
acquisition investments decrease in the revenue share: eR0i(σ) < 0 for all
σ ∈ [0, 1]. (iii) For large enough revenue shares the expected proÞt in the
race with private signals decreases in the revenue share: there is a shareeσI < 1
2
such that eΠ0i(σ) < 0 for all σ ≥ eσI.
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8 Conclusion
This paper studies the interaction between the incentives to acquire and
reveal information and the subsequent incentives to invest in R&D. The
appropriability of the winners revenues plays a key role in determining the
incentives of Þrms to invest and reveal. Revenue sharing between winner
and loser of the R&D race reduces overinvestments in R&D. The magnitude
of the revenue spillover aﬀects the direction into which Þrms would like to
misrepresent their private information. Finally revenue sharing introduces
two conßicting eﬀects for the information acquisition incentives. On the one
hand, revenue sharing softens free-rider eﬀects that are due to the public good
nature of information. On the other hand it weakens information acquisition
incentives since the resulting expected revenues leak away to the rival.
How much information Þrms strategically reveal to their rival depends
both on the appropriability of revenues, and on the veriÞability of informa-
tion. With non-veriÞability information Þrms always have an incentive to
misrepresent their private information. However if information can be cost-
lessly veriÞed, information disclosure only occurs for extreme revenue share.
For intermediate revenue shares the unraveling result does not emerge.
These results directly feed back in the Þrms R&D incentives and their ex-
pected proÞts.
Although we made a substantial Þrst step in the analysis of learning eﬀects
in R&D races, there remain some interesting extensions. For example, an
analysis of welfare eﬀects, and the eﬀects of incomplete licensing contracts
await future research.
A Appendix
In this Appendix we prove the main propositions of this paper. First we
prove the lemmas on eﬃcient and equilibrium R&D investments and proÞts
in the race with public signals. The second subsection contains proofs of
the propositions on equilibrium investments for private signals. Subsection 3
proves the propositions concerning the eﬀects of revenue sharing. In subsec-
tion 4 we prove the lemmas and propositions concerning strategic information
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revelation. Finally, in subsection 5, we prove the propositions that concern
strategic information acquisition.
A.1 Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2
 Proof of Lemma 1 (Benchmark): (i) The inequality Di(to;R) >
Di(to;R) obviously holds, since E(θ|to;R) = θ + φ(R) > θ = E(θ|to;R).
(ii) The inequality ∂Di(to;R)/∂R < 0 obviously holds, since φ
0(R) > 0. To
prove the inequality D
0
i(R) > 0 we note that expression (9) can be rewritten
as follows:
D
0
i(R) =
2p(1−R)φ(R)2W
(θ + 2∆)(θ + φ(R) + 2∆)2
, (37)
which obviously exceeds zero. (iii) The inequality Π
0
i(R) > 0 follows immedi-
ately from the fact that Πi(R) = 12Di(R)W and D
0
i(R) > 0, which completes
the proof.¤
 Proof of Lemma 2 (Public Signals): Parts (i) and (ii) of the lemma
are identical to parts (i) and (ii) in lemma 1 with 2∆ replaced by ∆. (iii)
The inequality bΠ0i(R) > 0 follows from rewriting expression (14) as follows:bΠ0i(R) = p(1−R)φ(R)2W 2[θ(θ + φ(R))−∆(θ + 2∆)](θ +∆)2(θ + φ(R) +∆)3 , (38)
which exceeds zero since
θ(θ + φ(R))−∆(θ + 2∆) ≥ θ2 −∆(θ + 2∆) = (θ +∆)(θ − 2∆) > 0. (39)
This completes the proof.¤
A.2 Proofs for Private Signal Race
In this subsection of the Appendix we prove propositions 1 and 2.
 Proof of Proposition 1 (Investments): Solving equations (15) and
(16) for i, j = 1, 2 (i 6= j) gives the following equilibrium R&D investments
with private signals for Þrm i:
eDi(t;R) = (θ + ϕ(R) + (R− P (R))∆)Wen(R) , and (40)eDi(t;R) = (θ + (R− P (R))∆)Wen(R) , (41)
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with
en(R) ≡ (θ +R∆) (θ + ϕ(R) + (1− P (R))∆)− (1−R)P (R)∆2. (42)
For the comparison of equilibrium investments in the races with public and
with private signals, we observe that:
eDi(t;R)− bDi(to;R) = (1−R)∆ϕ(R)Wen(R)(θ +∆) > 0, andeDi(t;R)− bDi(to;R) = θ[φ(R)− ϕ(R)]Wen(R)(θ + φ(R) +∆) > 0.
The comparison of expected investments results in the following:
eDi(R)− bDi(R) = −pR(1−R)φ(R)ϕ(R)(θ − (1−R)∆)Wen(R)(θ + φ(R) +∆)(θ +∆) < 0.
It is obvious that part (i) of lemma 1 holds for eDi(.;R). For lemma 1 (ii)s
properties we simply observe the signs of the following expressions (i = 1, 2):
∂ eDi(t;R)
∂R
=
−(1− p)∆(θ +∆)ϕ(R)
(1− pR)en(R)2 < 0, and
∂ eDi(t;R)
∂R
=
−pθ(θ +∆)ϕ(R)
(1− pR)en(R)2 < 0,
while
eD0i(R) = eDi(t;R)− eDi(t;R) + pR∂ eDi(t;R)∂R + (1− pR)∂ eDi(t;R)∂R
=
pθϕ(R)2en(R)2 > 0.
This completes the proof.¤
Proof of Proposition 2 (ProÞts): (i) It follows directly from proposition
1 and expression (19) that eπi(t;R) > bπi(to;R). For a high-signal Þrm we
analyze the proÞt diﬀerence:
eπi(t;R)− bπi(to;R) = 1
2
(θ + ϕ(R)) eDi(t;R)2 − 1
2
(θ + φ(R)) bDi(to;R)2
=
(θ + ϕ(R))(θ + φ(R) +∆)2(θ + (R − P (R))∆)2 − (θ + φ(R))en(R)2
2en(R)2(θ + φ(R) +∆)2 ,(43)
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where the numerator equals:
−ϕ(R)2(θ + φ(R))(θ +R∆)2 + ϕ(R)(θ + (R− P (R))∆)2 ·
·[φ(R)2(θ + (R− P (R))∆)2 − φ(R)2P (R)(θ +∆) +
−(θ +∆)(θ2 − (1−R− P (R))θ∆− (R− P (R))∆2)] +
+φ(R)(θ + (R− P (R))∆)(φ(R)θ + (θ +∆)(θ −∆)). (44)
DeÞne variable x ≡ (1−p)(θ−θ), and note that φ(R) = x/(p(1−R)2+1−p),
and ϕ(R) = x/(1 − pR). Substitution of these expressions in (43) gives the
following:
eπi(t;R)− bπi(to;R) = P (R)x(ax2 + bx+ c)
2(p(1−R)2 + 1− p)2(1− pR)2en(R)2(θ + φ(R) +∆)2 ,
as is clear after inspection of expression (44). Since x > 0, it suﬃces to show
that a, b, c > 0 for all θ ≥ 3∆. First we show that a is positive:
a = (1− pR)[θ2 − (1−R)2θ∆− (1 +R−R2)∆2] + (1−R)∆2
> (1−R)[R2∆2 +R∆(2θ −∆) + θ(θ − 2∆)] > 0.
Second we show that b is positive if θ ≥ 3∆:
b = (2− pR(3−R))(1− pR)[(θ3 − 2(1−R)θ2∆− (1 + 2R−R2)θ∆2)] +
+(2− pR(3−R))[2(1−R)θ∆2 − (1− p)R∆3] + pR2(1−R)(1− p)∆3.
Since b is increasing in parameter θ, it suﬃces to show that b exceeds zero in
θ = 3∆, which is obvious after inspection of the following expression:
b|θ=3∆ = (2− pR(3−R))R[19 + 3R− p(7 + 12R+ 3R2)]∆3 +
+pR2(1−R)(1− p)∆3.
Finally we show that c > 0 for all θ ≥ 3∆:
c = (p(1−R)2 + 1− p)(θ +∆)[(1− pR)θ + (1− p)R∆] · c0(θ), with
c0(θ) ≡ [(1− pR)θ2 − (3−R− 2pR(2−R))θ∆− (1− p)R∆2].
Since c0(θ) increases in θ, we complete the proof of part (i) by observing that:
c0(θ) ≥ c0(3∆) = 2R[(1 + p(2− 3R)]∆2 > 0.
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Since x > 0 and a, b, c > 0 for all θ ≥ 3∆, we conclude that eπi(t;R) >bπi(to;R) for all θ ≥ 3∆.
(ii) The proof is similar to part (i). We can rewrite the proÞt diﬀerence with
public and private signals as follows:
bΠi(R)− eΠi(R) = P (R)x2(Ax2 +Bx+ C)
2(p(1−R)2 + 1− p)2(1− pR)en(R)2(θ +∆)(θ + φ(R) +∆)2 .
(ii.a) Note that for θ suﬃciently small x is approximately zero. In that case
the sign of bΠi(R)− eΠi(R) is determined by the sign of C. We can rewrite C
as follows:
C = [p(1−R)2 + 1− p](θ +∆)2 · C1(p), with
C1(p,R) ≡ (1− pR)θ2(θ − 2(2−R)∆) +
+(1− (5− 3p)R+R2)θ∆2 + 2(1− p)R(1−R)∆3.
Notice that for R = 0 and R = 1, respectively, we obtain the following:
C1(p, 0) ≡ θ(θ − 4θ∆+∆2) < 0, for all θ < (2 +
√
3)∆,
C1(p, 1) ≡ (1− p)θ(θ +∆)(θ − 3∆) > 0, for all θ > 3∆.
Since C1(p,R) is continuous in R, critical values R0 and R00 exist, which
proves part (ii.a) of the proposition.
(ii.b) For part (ii.b) it suﬃces to show that A,B,C > 0 for all θ ≥ (2+√3)∆,
since x > 0. First we show that A > 0:
A ≡ θ[∆2R2 +∆(2θ −∆)R+ θ2 − 2θ∆−∆2] > 0, for all θ ≥ 3∆,
and therefore certainly for all θ ≥ (2+√3)∆. Second we can write coeﬃcient
B as follows:
B ≡ (θ +∆){pR(1−R)[(3−R)θ − (1−R)∆]∆2 +
+[2− pR(3−R)](θ3 − (3− 2R)∆θ2 −R(3−R)∆3θ +R(1−R)∆3)},
Since B is linear in parameter p, it suﬃces to show that B > 0 for p ∈ {0, 1},
for showing that B is positive for all p. If p = 0, B equals:
B|p=0 = 2(θ +∆)[θ3 − (3− 2R)∆θ2 −R(3−R)∆3θ +R(1−R)∆3]
= 2(θ +∆)[(2θ − (1−R)∆)(θ −∆)R∆+ θ2(θ − 3∆) > 0,
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for all θ ≥ 3∆. If p = 1, B equals:
B|p=1 = (θ +∆)(1−R) ·B1(R), with
B1(R) ≡ 2θ2(θ − 3∆)−R(θ3 − 7θ2∆+ 3θ∆2 −∆3) +
−R2∆(θ −∆)[2θ − (2−R)∆],
which is concave in R. Note that if θ ≥ 3∆, B1(0) = 2θ2(θ − 3∆) > 0, and
B1(1) = θ
2(θ−∆) > 0, and since B1(R) is concave in R, B|p=1 > 0 for all R,
if θ ≥ 3∆. This establishes that if θ ≥ 3∆, B > 0. Third we need to show
that if θ ≥ (2 +√3)∆, then C > 0. Notice that C1(p,R) is linear in p, with
C1(0, R) = R∆(θ − 2∆)[2θ − (1−R)∆] + θ(θ2 − 4θ∆+∆2), and
C1(1, R) = θ(1−R)[R∆(2θ −∆) + θ2 − 4θ∆+∆2].
If θ ≥ (2 +√3)∆, then θ2 − 4θ∆ +∆2 > 0, and consequently C1(p,R) > 0
and C > 0. This completes the proof of part (ii.b) of the proposition.
(iii) Finally we show that if θ ≥ 3∆, eΠi(R) increases in R, as in lemma 1
(iii), by observing that:
eΠ0i(R) = pθϕ(R)2 · g(θ)(1− pR)en(R)3 ,
with
g(θ) ≡ (1− p)(θ −R∆)θ + p[(1−R)θ2 +R∆(θ + 3∆)]− (θ + 3R∆)∆
> g(θ) = (θ −∆)θ −R∆(θ + 3∆)− pR(θ +∆)(θ − 3∆)
≥ (1−R)θ(θ −∆), for all θ ≥ 3∆.
Since for all θ ≥ 3∆: g(θ) > g(θ) > 0 , we obtain that eΠ0i(R) > 0, for all
θ ≥ 3∆. This proves the proposition.¤
A.3 Proofs for Revenue Sharing
In this subsection of the Appendix we prove propositions 3 and 4.
 Proof of Proposition 3 (Interim): (i) The fact that equilibrium invest-
ments decrease in the revenue share follows obviously from expression (23).
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(ii) The derivative of the equilibrium interim proÞts with respect to the rev-
enue share σ is linear in σ. This is clear after diﬀerentiating expression (24)
with respect to σ:
∂πi(.|σ)
∂σ
= (1− 2σ)(WDj(.)− πi(.))− πi(.).
Initially expected interim proÞts increase in σ, i.e. ∂πi(.|0)/∂σ =WDj(.)−
2πi(.) > 0, since with public signals we obtain:
∂bπi(.|0)
∂σ
= W bDj(.)− 2bπi(.) = W 2
E(θ|.) +∆
µ
1− E(θ|.)
E(θ|.) +∆
¶
> 0,
and with private signals we obtain:
∂eπi(t;R|0)
∂σ
= eDj(t;R)³W − θ eDi(t;R)´ = eDj(t;R)Wen(R) · eg0(R),
with eg0(R) ≡ en(R)− θ[θ + ϕ(R) + (R− P (R))∆]
= ∆(R[θ + ϕ(R) + (1− P (R))∆] + (1−R)[θ − P (R)∆]) > 0,
and
∂eπi(t;R|0)
∂σ
= eDj(t;R)³W − (θ + ϕ(R)) eDi(t;R)´ = eDj(t;R)Wen(R) · eg1(R),
with eg1(R) ≡ en(R)− (θ + ϕ(R))[θ + (R − P (R))∆]
= ∆(P (R)[θ + ϕ(R)− (1−R)∆] + (1− P (R))[θ +R∆]) > 0,
with en(R) as in (42). It is clear that for σ = 1
2
equilibrium proÞts are
decreasing in σ: ∂πi(.|12)/∂σ = −πi(.) < 0. Since ∂πi(.|σ)/∂σ is linear in
σ, this gives the existence of critical share σ0 ∈ (0, 1
2
). This completes the
proof.¤
 Proof of Proposition 4 (Ex Ante): (i) This follows clearly from ex-
pression (26).
(ii.a)We evaluate the diﬀerence in expected eﬃcient proÞts and maximal ex-
pected equilibrium proÞts for Þrms with public signals. The proÞt diﬀerence
is as follows:
Πi(R)− bΠi(R|bσ(R)) = 2WDi(R)
³ bDj(R)W − bΠi(R)´− bDj(R)2W 2
4
³ bDj(R)W − bΠi(R)´ , (45)
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where the numerator equals:
bDj(R)W 2 ³2Di(R)− bDj(R)´− 2WDi(R)bΠi(R)
= W 4
µ
E
½
1
θ +∆
¾
E
½
θ
(θ + 2∆)(θ +∆)
¾
− E
½
1
θ + 2∆
¾
E
½
θ
(θ +∆)2
¾¶
= W 4
θ + qφ(R) +∆
(θ +∆)(θ + φ(R) +∆)
·
·
µ
qθ
(θ + 2∆)(θ +∆)
+
(1− q)(θ + φ(R))
(θ + φ(R) + 2∆)(θ + φ(R) +∆)
¶
+
−W 4 θ + qφ(R) + 2∆
(θ + 2∆)(θ + φ(R) + 2∆)
µ
qθ
(θ +∆)2
+
(1− q)(θ + φ(R))
(θ + φ(R) +∆)2
¶
=
q(1− q)(p(1−R)2 + 1− p)φ(R)2∆2W 4
(θ +∆)2(θ + φ(R) +∆)2(θ + 2∆)(θ + φ(R) + 2∆)
> 0, with
q ≡ p(1 − (1 − R)2). Second we show that eﬃcient expected proÞts ex-
ceed maximal expected proÞts of Þrms with private signals. The diﬀerence
between the expected eﬃcient proÞt and the maximal expected equilibrium
proÞt with private signals, Πi(R)− eΠi(R|eσ(R)), is similar to expression (45)
with bDj(R) (resp. bΠi(R)) replaced by eDj(R) (resp. eΠi(R)). We rewrite the
numerator of this expression, with en(R) as deÞned in (42), as follows:
(θ + φ(R) + 2∆)(θ + 2∆)en(R)2 ³ eDj(R)W − eΠi(R)´³Πi(R)− eΠi(R|eσ(R))´
= W 4(θ + (2−R)pRφ(R) + 2∆)[2en(R)(θ + pRϕ(R) + (R− P (R))∆)
−(θ + ϕ(R))(θ + (R− P (R))∆)2 − pRϕ(R)(θ(θ + ϕ(R))− (R − P (R))2∆2)]
−W 4(θ + φ(R) + 2∆)(θ + 2∆)(θ + pRϕ(R) + (R − P (R))∆)2
= pRϕ(R)φ(R)W 4[P (R)(θ − 2(1−R)∆)(1− p)(θ − θ) +
+(1−R)(θ − 2(1−R)∆)θ + (1− p)(2−R)(R− P (R))R∆2],
which obviously exceeds zero for all R.
(ii.b) To prove part (b) we need to show that if θ ≥ 3∆, bΠi(R|bσ(R)) −eΠi(R|eσ(R)) > 0. This expected proÞt diﬀerence equals:
bΠi(R|bσ(R))− eΠi(R|eσ(R)) =
W 2
bDj(R)2 ³ eDj(R)W − eΠi(R)´− eDj(R)2 ³ bDj(R)W − bΠi(R)´
4
³ bDj(R)W − bΠi(R)´³ eDj(R)W − eΠi(R)´
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The numerator of this expression can be rewritten to:bDj(R)2 ³ eDj(R)W − eΠi(R)´− eDj(R)2 ³ bDj(R)W − bΠi(R)´ =
P (R)y2(αy2 + βy + γ)
2(p(1−R)2 + 1− p)2(1− pR)(θ +∆)2(θ + φ(R) +∆)2en(R)2 ,
where y ≡ pR(1− p)(θ − θ) and
α ≡ (2−R)(θ − 2(1−R)∆) > 0,
β ≡ (3−R)(θ − 2(1−R)∆)θ − (1−R)(1 + 2R−R2)∆2 +
−2pR(2−R)[θ2 − (1−R)(2θ +∆)∆]
> (1−R)[(3− 2R)(θ − 2(1−R)∆)θ − (1−R)2∆2], if θ ≥ 3∆
> (1−R)(8 + 14R− 13R2) > 0, if θ ≥ 3∆
γ ≡ (p(1−R)2 + 1− p)[(θ − 2(1−R)∆)θ + (1 +R−R2)∆2 +
−pR(θ +∆)(θ − (3− 2R)∆)
> (1−R)[θ2 − (1−R)(2θ +∆)∆] > 0, if θ ≥ 3∆.
Since α,β, γ > 0 if θ ≥ 3∆,and y > 0, we obtain bΠi(R|bσ(R)) > eΠi(R|eσ(R))
for all R, if θ ≥ 3∆.
(iii) We prove property (iii) of lemma 1 by observing that if θ ≥ 3∆, then
both ex ante expected winner-take-all investments and proÞts increase in
the signals precision, R, as shown in lemma 2 and propositions 1 and 2. This
completes the proof.¤
A.4 Proofs for Strategic Revelation
In this subsection we prove proposition 5, lemma 3, and proposition 6.
 Proof of Proposition 5 (No Complete Revelation): Suppose com-
plete revelation does happen in equilibrium. Then equilibrium beliefs are
such that any statement is believed. Firm js equilibrium investments would
be bDj(to;R|σ) and bDj(to;R|σ), respectively. Suppose that Þrm j fully reveals
his information, and that he received signal tj = t. Then if Þrm i received
signal t and reveals it, Þrms invest bD(to;R|σ), and Þrm i has expected proÞt:
πi(t|t) = (1− σ)W 2
(1− σ)1
2
θ + σ(θ +∆)
(θ +∆)2
.
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If Þrm i states t instead, this makes Þrm j invest bDj(to;R|σ). Firm is
optimal response to bDj(to;R|σ) is (θ + φ(R)) bDj(to;R|σ)/θ. Firm is proÞt
from overstating his signal is consequently:
πi(t|t) = (1− σ)W 2
(1− σ)1
2
(θ + φ(R))2 + σθ(θ + φ(R) +∆)
θ(θ + φ(R) +∆)2
.
The diﬀerence in proÞt between overstating and truth-telling is:
πi(t|t)− πi(t|t) = (1− σ)W
2 ((1− σ)κ+ σ(−λ))
θ(θ +∆)2(θ + φ(R) +∆)2
,
with
κ ≡ 1
2
¡
[(θ + φ(R))(θ +∆)]2 − [θ(θ + φ(R) +∆)]2¢ ,
λ ≡ θ(θ +∆)(θ + φ(R) +∆)φ(R).
Hence, there is a σ ∈ (0, 1) such that πi(t|t) > πi(t|t) iﬀ σ < σ. Simi-
lar for a t-Þrm i, stating t (resp. t) makes t-Þrm j choose bDj(to;R|σ) (resp.bDj(to;R|σ)). Firm is optimal response to this investment is θ bDi(to;R|σ)/(θ+
φ(R)) (resp. bDi(to;R|σ)). Firm is proÞt for understating his signal is:
πi(t|t) = (1− σ)W 2
(1− σ)1
2
θ2 + σ(θ +∆)(θ + φ(R))
(θ +∆)2(θ + φ(R))
,
while truth-telling gives the Þrm:
πi(t|t) = (1− σ)W 2
(1− σ)1
2
(θ + φ(R)) + σ(θ + φ(r) +∆)
(θ + φ(R) +∆)2
.
The diﬀerence in proÞt between understating and truth-telling is:
πi(t|t)− πi(t|t) = (1− σ)W
2 ((1− σ)(−κ) + σΛ)
(θ +∆)2(θ + φ(R) +∆)2(θ + φ(R))
,
with
Λ ≡ (θ + φ(R))(θ +∆)(θ + φ(R) +∆)φ(R).
Hence, there is a σ ∈ (0, 1) such that πi(t|t) ≥ πi(t|t) iﬀ σ ≥ σ. Since
φ(R) > 0, we obtain that λ < Λ. This implies that σ < σ, and, thus, is
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deviating from complete revelation proÞtable for all σ ∈ [0, 1]. This completes
the proof.¤
 Proof of Lemma 3 (No Revelation): Observe that if Þrms never
update their beliefs, each Þrm is indiﬀerent between all revelation rules, i.e.
πi(τ i(ti), τ j) = πi(τ
0
i(ti), τ j) = Eθ
n
πi( eD; θ)|ti;Ro for all τ i, τ 0i and τ j. No
revelation, e.g. τ i(ti) = t for all ti ∈ {t, t} with i = 1, 2, is therefore weakly
preferred by Þrms, which is consistent with beliefs. For σ < σ and σ > σ
there are more out-of-equilibrium beliefs that support non-revelation as an
equilibrium strategy. For example it is easy to verify that, if σ < σ (resp. σ >
σ), the skeptical out-of-equilibrium belief that assigns probability 1 to signal
t (resp. t) after a deviation implements the non-informative equilibrium.
This completes the proof.¤
 Proof of Proposition 6 (VeriÞable Information): If only one type of
Þrm chooses to conceal its signal, its rival can infer its information perfectly.
We therefore only need to distinguish between strategies of full disclosure
and full concealment. We take σ, σ, and πi(.|.) as in the proof to proposition
5, and characterize part (i), (ii) and (iii), respectively.
(i) Take σ ≤ σ. Suppose that Þrm j discloses its information: τ j(tj) = tj for
tj ∈ {t, t}. In that case Þrm is disclosure rule can only aﬀect the equilibrium
outcome if Þrm j discloses t. Firm is expected proÞt from disclosing private
signals t and t is then πi(t|t) and πi(t|t), respectively. Suppose that Þrm i
deviates from complete revelation and conceals its signal. After concealment
Þrm j updates its beliefs skeptically, and believes that ti = t with probability
1, i.e. πi(∅|ti) ≡ πi(t|ti). Consequently it invests bDj(to;R|σ) in R&D. This
leaves Þrm i indiﬀerent between disclosing and concealing when ti = t. If Þrm
i has private signal t, it prefers to disclose its signal, since πi(t|t) ≥ πi(t|t)
iﬀ σ ≤ σ. Hence sceptical beliefs are consistent with Þrms incentives, and
Þrms disclosure strategies are optimal given beliefs.
(ii) Take σ < σ < σ, and suppose that Þrm j discloses its information. Firm
js investments can only be aﬀected by Þrm is disclosure decision when
Þrm j receives a bad signal, tj = t. We consider this case. After Þrm is
concealment, bti = ∅, Þrm j assigns probability µ to the contingency that
38
Þrm i received a good signal, ti = t, with 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. Firm js expected
costs of investment after concealment are θ + (1 − µ)φ(R). The Þrst-order
condition for Þrm js investments is as follows:
(θ + (1− µ)φ(R))Dj(∅;R) = (1− σ)W −
¡
µDi(t) + (1− µ)Di(t)
¢
∆.
Firm is Þrst-order conditions remain unchanged. Given Þrm js belief, we
obtain the following equilibrium investments:
Dµj (∅;R|σ) =
(1− σ)W
Nµ
[θ(θ + φ(R))− (θ + µφ(R))∆] ,
Dµi (t;R|σ) =
(1− σ)W
Nµ
(θ + φ(R))(θ + (1− µ)φ(R)−∆),
Dµi (t;R|σ) =
(1− σ)W
Nµ
θ(θ + (1− µ)φ(R)−∆),
with
Nµ ≡ θ(θ + φ(R))(θ + (1− µ)φ(R))− (θ + µφ(R))∆2.
Firm is expected equilibrium proÞts are:
πµi (∅|t) =
1
2
θDµi (t;R|σ)2 + σWDµj (∅;R|σ)
πµi (∅|t) =
1
2
(θ + φ(R))Dµi (t;R|σ)2 + σWDµj (∅;R|σ).
Note that for belief µ = 0 Þrm i strictly prefers to conceal t, since π0i (∅|t) =
πi(t|t) > πi(t|t) for σ < σ. We can therefore rule out belief µ = 0 as
supporting a full disclosure equilibrium. Belief µ = 1 can be ruled out too,
because Þrm i prefers to conceal a bad signal given this belief, i.e. π1i (∅|t) =
πi(t|t) > πi(t|t) for σ > σ. For beliefs strictly between 0 and 1 there is a
critical value σµ (resp. σµ) such that disclosing t (resp. t) is proÞtable for
Þrm i iﬀ σ ≥ σµ (resp. σ ≤ σµ). The critical values are deÞned as follows:
σµ =
θ + φ(R)
2nµ(t)
³
dµi (t;R)
2 − bdi(t;R)2´ , and
σµ =
θ
2nµ(t)
³
dµi (t;R)
2 − bdi(t;R)2´ ,
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where
nµ(ti) ≡ 1
2
E(θ|ti, t)
³
dµi (ti;R)
2 − bdi(ti;R)2´− ³dµj (∅;R)− bdj(ti;R)´ ,
for ti ∈ {t, t} and i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and d`(.) ≡ D`(.)/(1−σ)W , with ` = i, j.
For revenue share σ and belief µ full disclosure is an equilibrium strategy,
iﬀ σµ ≤ σ ≤ σµ. First we verify that both σµ and σµ are monotonically
decreasing in belief µ for 0 < µ < 1. DeÞne:
mµ(ti) ≡ 1
2
∂dµj (∅;R)
∂µ
³
dµi (ti;R)
2 − bdi(ti;R)2´+
−dµi (ti;R)
∂dµi (ti;R)
∂µ
³
dµj (∅;R)− bdj(ti;R)´ ,
for ti ∈ {t, t} and i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Diﬀerentiation of σµ and σµ results in
the following:
∂σµ
∂µ
=
(θ + φ(R))mµ(t)
nµ(t)2
=
−µ2 1
2
θφ(R)3∆2(θ + φ(R))(θ + φ(R)−∆)(θ −∆)3
(θ + φ(R) +∆)2nµ(t)2N4µ
,
∂σµ
∂µ
=
θmµ(t)
nµ(t)2
=
−(1− µ)2 1
2
θ2φ(R)3∆2(θ + φ(R))(θ + φ(R)−∆)3(θ −∆)
(θ +∆)2nµ(t)2N4µ
.
These expressions are clearly non-positive. Furthermore, it is easily veriÞed
that:
lim
µ↓0
σµ =
∆
θ + φ(R) + 2∆
<
∆
θ + 2∆
= lim
µ↑1
σµ.
In combination with monotonicity this implies that σµ < σµ for all 0 < µ < 1.
Therefore there is no belief µ such that full disclosure is chosen in equilibrium.
(iii) For σ ≥ σ we have a similar argument as in (i). Sceptical beliefs after
concealment are to believe that your rival has a bad signal, i.e. πi(∅|ti) ≡
πi(t|ti). This leaves Þrm i with a bad signal indiﬀerent between disclosing
and concealing. Firm i with a good signal is worse oﬀ by concealing his
signal, since πi(t|t) ≤ πi(t|t) iﬀ σ ≥ σ. This completes the proof.¤
A.5 Proofs for Information Acquisition
In this subsection we prove propositions 7 and 8.
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 Eﬃcient Information Acquisition: When Þrms choose information
acquisition investments that maximize their joint expected proÞts, Þrm is
eﬃcient R&D investment D
I
i (to;Ri, Rj) equals (6) with φ(R) replaced by:
φI(Ri, Rj) ≡ (1− p)(θ − θ)
p(1−Ri)(1−Rj) + 1− p. (46)
Notice that φI(R,R) = φ(R). Given these eﬃcient R&D investments, each
Þrm chooses its information acquisition investments to maximize the sum of
the Þrms ex ante expected proÞts, i.e. Þrms maximize:
[p(1−Ri)(1−Rj) + 1− p]
2X
`=1
π`
³
D
I
(to;Ri, Rj); θ + φ
I(Ri, Rj)
´
+
+p[1− (1−Ri)(1−Rj)]
2X
`=1
π`
³
D
I
(to;Ri, Rj); θ
´
− 1
2
ρ
2X
`=1
R2` ,
which results in Þrst-order condition (29).
 Proof of Proposition 7: Firm is equilibrium R&D investments in the
race with public signals, given two bad signals, are as follows:
bDIi (to;Ri|σ) = bDi(to; r|σ) θ + φ(r)
θ + φI(Ri, rj)
.
The Þrms expected proÞts given equilibrium R&D investments are as follows:
[p(1−Ri)(1−Rj) + 1− p]πi
³ bDIi (to;Ri|σ), bDIj (to; rj|σ); θ + φI(Ri, Rj)¯¯¯ σ´+
+p[1− (1−Ri)(1−Rj)]πi
³ bDI(to´;Ri|σ); θ¯¯¯ σ´− 12ρR2i . (47)
The Þrst-order condition of proÞt maximization is stated in expression (30),
and the second-order condition is as follows:
ρ ≥ −(1− σ)2p(1−R)
∂πi
³ bDI(to;R); θ´
∂Ri
. (48)
(i) First-order condition (29) for eﬃcient information acquisition reduces to:
ρR =
p(1−R)φ(R)2W 2
(θ + 2∆)(θ + φ(R) + 2∆)2
. (49)
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The winner-take-all marginal revenue of acquiring a public signal is maxi-
mally:
dMR(R) = p(1−R)½1
2
θ bDi(to;R)2 − µ12θ + φ(R)
¶ bDi(to;R)2¾
=
p(1−R)φ(R) ¡1
2
θφ(R)− (θ +∆)∆¢W 2
(θ +∆)2(θ + φ(R) +∆)2
.
First we show that marginal revenues of eﬃcient information acquisition
investments are strictly larger than those in the public signal race:
p(1−R)φ(R)2W 2
(θ + 2∆)(θ + φ(R) + 2∆)2
>
p(1−R)φ(R) ¡1
2
θφ(R)−∆(θ +∆)¢W 2
(θ +∆)2(θ + φ(R) +∆)2
,
which certainly holds whenever
1
(θ + 2∆)(θ + φ(R) + 2∆)2
>
1
2
θ
(θ +∆)2(θ + φ(R) +∆)2
⇔
(θ +∆)2(θ + φ(R) +∆)2 >
1
2
θ(θ + 2∆)(θ + φ(R) + 2∆)2 ⇔
φ(R)2(2∆2 + 2θ∆+ θ2) + 2φ(R)(2∆3 + 2θ∆2 + 2θ2∆+ θ3)+
+(2∆4 + 2∆θ3 + θ4) > 0,
which obviously holds. Since marginal costs are identical, this gives underin-
vestments in information acquisition of Þrms competing in a winner-take-all
race with public signals.
(ii) First, we that bR(σ) is single-peaked in the revenue share. For a given
R the equilibrium marginal revenue of information acquisition is maximized
for the following revenue share:
bσI(R) ≡ dMQ(R)− 2dMR(R)
2
hdMQ(R)− dMR(R)i = θ
2 + (4θ + φ(R))∆+ 3∆2
(θ + 2∆)(2θ + φ(R) + 2∆)
Notice that for all R: 0 < bσI(R) < 1, since
(θ + 2∆)(2θ + φ(R) + 2∆)− [θ2 + (4θ + φ(R))∆+ 3∆2] = (θ +∆)(θ + φ(R) +∆) > 0.
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This revenue share decreases in R, since:
dbσI(R)
dR
= φ0(R)
∂bσI(R)
∂φ
=
−φ0(R)(θ +∆)2
(θ + 2∆)(2θ + φ(R) + 2∆)2
< 0.
DeÞne bσI0 ≡ bσI(1) and bσI1 ≡ bσI(0). Hence for all σ < bσI0 (resp. σ > bσI1)
marginal information acquisition revenues increase (resp. decrease) in σ for
all R. Since marginal costs do not depend on the revenue share, we can
conclude that for all σ < bσI0 (resp. σ > bσI1): bR0(σ) > 0 (resp. bR0(σ) < 0).
Second, after substituting bσI(R) in the marginal revenue function at the right
hand side of expression (30), we obtain the following:
(1− bσI(R))³(1− bσI(R))dMR(R) + bσI(R)dMQ(R)´
=
dMQ(R)2
4
hdMQ(R)− dMR(R)i = p(1−R)φ(R)W
2
2(θ + 2∆)(2θ + φ(R) + 2∆)
.
We substract this expression from the eﬃcient marginal revenues of informa-
tion acquisition, as in the right hand side of expression (49), and obtain the
following:
p(1−R)φ(R)2W 2
(θ + 2∆)(θ + φ(R) + 2∆)2
− p(1−R)φ(R)W
2
2(θ + 2∆)(2θ + φ(R) + 2∆)
=
p(1−R)φ(R)W 2[φ(R)2 + 2θφ(R)− (θ + 2∆)2]
2(θ + 2∆)(θ + φ(R) + 2∆)2(2θ + φ(R) + 2∆)
,
which exceeds zero if
φ(R) >
q
2(θ2 + 2θ∆+ 2∆2)− θ.
Since φ(R) increases in R this inequality holds for all R if:
pθ + (1− p)θ >
q
2(θ2 + 2θ∆+ 2∆2),
which is stated in the proposition.
(iii) This part of the proposition follows directly from part (ii), and propo-
sition 4 (i) and (iii), where bσII0 ≡ min
R
{bσ(R), bσI0} and bσII1 ≡ max
R
{bσ(R), bσI1}.
This completes the proof.¤
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 Proof of Proposition 8: The Þrst-order conditions for Þrm is winner-
take-all R&D investments change into:
θ eDIi (t) = W − ³rj eDIj (t) + (1− rj) eDIj (t; rj)´∆,
(θ + ϕ(Ri)) eDIi (t;Ri) = W − ³P I(Ri, rj) eDIj (t) + [1− P I(Ri, rj)] eDIj (t; rj)´∆,
with ϕ(.) as in (17), and P I(Ri, rj) =
p(1−Ri)rj
p(1−Ri)+1−p . Naturally the equilibrium
R&D investments of revenue sharing Þrms equal: eDIi (.|σ) = (1− σ) eDIi (.).
Firm is expected proÞt of information acquisition given equilibrium R&D
investments
³ eDIi , eDIj´ is summarized in the following expression:
(1− pRi)πi
³ eDIi (t;Ri|σ), P I eDIj (t|σ) +(1− P I) eDIj (t; rj|σ); θ + ϕ(Ri)¯¯¯ σ´+
+pRiπi
³ eDIi (t|σ), Rj eDIj (t|σ) + (1−Rj) eDIj (t; rj|σ); θ¯¯¯ σ´− 12ρR2i , (50)
where P I stands for P I(Ri, Rj). Expression (35) gives the Þrst-order con-
dition for proÞt maximizing information acquisition, while the second-order
condition is as follows:
ρ ≥ −(1− σ)22p∂
eDIi (t;R)
∂Ri
ÃeDi(t;R)− eDi(t;R) + (1− pR)ϕ(R)∂ eDIi (t;R)
∂Ri
!
.
(51)
(i) We compare marginal revenues of information acquisition for public sig-
nals with those for private signals. Naturally, from (31) we obtain:
dMR(R) = 12pθφ(R)2W 2
(θ +∆)2(θ + φ(R) +∆)2
=
1
2
pθ(1− p)2(θ − θ)2W 2
[p(1−R)2 + 1− p]2(θ +∆)2(θ + φ(R) +∆)2 . (52)
Marginal information acquisition revenues in the winner-take-all race with
private signals reduces to the following:
ρR =
1
2
pθϕ(R)2W 2en(R)2 = 12pθ(1− p)2(θ − θ)2W 2(1− pR)2en(R)2 . (53)
When we compare denominators of (52) and (53), we obtain:
[p(1−R)2 + 1− p](θ +∆)(θ + φ(R) +∆)− (1− pR)en(R)
= (E(θ) +∆)[2θ + (1 +R)∆]− pR(3−R)(θ +∆)2.
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Since this expression is linear and decreasing in p it suﬃces to evaluate it for
p = 1. For p = 1 the expression reduces to:
(1−R)(θ +∆)[θ + (1−R)(θ +∆)] ≥ 0.
This implies that for any given precision R the marginal revenue of infor-
mation acquisition in the winner-take-all race with public signals is smaller
than the marginal revenue with private signals, while the marginal costs are
equal. Hence, in equilibrium Þrms invest more in acquiring private signals
than in acquiring public signals.
(ii) From equations (35) and (53) we conclude that the marginal revenue
of acquiring a private signal is decreasing in the revenue share σ. Since the
marginal cost of information acquisition is unaﬀected by the revenue share,
the equilibrium information acquisition investments are decreasing in the
revenue share.
(iii) The Þrst term of expression (36) is decreasing in σ, as shown in propo-
sitions 2 (iii) and in proposition 8 (ii). From proposition 4 it follows that
there is a share eσI < 1
2
such that the second term of expression (36) increases
for all σ < eσI , and decreases for all σ ≥ eσ0. Since both terms of expression
(36) are negative for σ ≥ eσI , eΠ0i(σ) < 0 for all σ ≥ eσI . This completes the
proof.¤
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